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The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Implications of Structural Damage 
S.A. Mahin 
Professor of Civil Engineering, University of California, Berkeley 
SYNOPSIS: The Lama Prieta earthquake provides a wealth of information on the seismic response of a 
wide variety of structures over a large metropolitan area. Soil amplification at sites distant from 
the epicenter contributed significantly to the substantial damages developed during the earthquake. 
Because of the large shaken area, the earthquake provides much useful information for all those 
interested in earthquake engineering. Structural damages resulting from the earthquake are reviewed 
herein with emphasis on buildings and bridges. Implications for modern design and retrofit methods are 
highlighted. Emphasis is placed on the need to carefully consider soil conditions, to treat the 
structure as a system rather than as an assemblage of independent elements, to explicitly define 
performance expectations, and to increase efforts to retrofit older seismically hazardous structures. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Lama Prieta earthquake of october 17, 1989 
has proven to be one of the most costly natural 
disasters in American history. Probably the most 
vivid examples of structural damages from the 
period immediately following the earthquake were 
the catastrophic collapse of the Cypress Street 
viaduct on Interstate 880 in Oakland, the partial 
collapse of a section of the San Francisco -
Oakland Bay Bridge and the distress to numerous 
buildings in San Francisco's Marina district. As 
additional data was gathered during the days and 
weeks that followed the earthquake, it became 
abundantly clear that damages were far more 
extensive than originally suspected. 
In total more than 18,000 dwellings and several 
thousand other structures were significantly 
damaged by the earthquake. Nearly a thousand of 
these were destroyed by the earthquake itself and 
500 more have been demolished since the earth-
quake. Numerous buildings and bridges stand 
empty today as studies continue to determine the 
technical and economic feasibility of restoring 
their structural integrity. 
Particularly severe damages were observed the 
epicentral region. The older downtown regions of 
santa Cruz, watsonville and Los Gatos (Fig. 1) 
were hard hit as were individual homes in the 
santa Cruz mountain. Today, several square 
blocks in watsonville and Santa Cruz have been 
demolished and stand vacant as silent reminders 
of the devastation caused by this earthquake. 
Highway and building structures were also damaged 
in localized regions throughout the greater San 
Francisco Bay Area. Significant damages were 
also observed in lifeline facilities (water 
pipelines and treatment plants in particular) , 
telecommunication facilities, and in the archi-
tectural and mechanical components and contents 
of buildings. The total cost of the physical 
damages to structures is estimated by FEMA to be 
in excess of $ 6.7 billion. However, the total 
cost of the earthquake considering the loss in 
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immediate and long term business revenue, damage 
to contents and inventories, medical and workma-
n's compensation claims, and reallocation of 
resources is likely several times this amount. 
The human toll of the earthquake was also sub-
stantial. sixty seven fatalities resulted from 
the earthquake and more than 3,700 injuries were 
reported. While these numbers are large, they 
are no where as large as might have been expected 
considering severity of structural damage. This 
is attributable in part to the fact that on the 
day of the earthquake many people had gone home 
early to watch the World Series of baseball. For 
example, based on the number of vehicles expected 
on the Cypress Viaduct on a normal workday, 
estimates of fatalities made just after the 
earthquake exceeded 700, substantially greater 
than the 42 deaths that actually occurred. This 
is indeed fortunate, but it is clear that had the 
earthquake occurred under more normal circum-
stances, casualties in this and other structures 
would likely have been far greater. 
In addition, the number of damaged and destroyed 
dwellings resulted in more than 10,000 displaced 
persons. Finding adequate food and shelter for 
these individuals contributed significantly to 
the recovery efforts. Fortuitously, the weather 
was good and with a few important exceptions the 
transportation infrastructure remained intact 
permitting relief supplies to be delivered to the 
needy. 
The Lama Prieta is the first major earthquake 
to strike a major metropolitan area in the U.S. 
in nearly 20 years. As such, it provides the 
earthquake engineering profession with a unique 
opportunity to assess structural design and 
retrofit methods. As the earthquake effected an 
area where even larger earthquakes are expected, 
an examination of the damages will provide par-
ticularly valuable indications of future damage 
trends. Because the levels of motion was not 
~musually severe, and because many different 
common structural types and soil conditions wer-e 
excited, the ea~thquake. should also 
planners and engJ.neers J.n other parts 
country with many valuable lessons. 
provide 
of the 
In this paper, the overall nature of the struc-
tural damages are reviewed. After making some 
overall comments on the apparent severity and 
distribution of the damages, information regard-
ing the specific types of structural damages 
observed is presented. Due to space limitations, 
emphasis is placed on building structures and 
bridges. Finally, the implications of these 
damages for the design of structures in seismi-
cally hazardous areas are offered. 
Additional detailed information on the damages 
can be found in the References. 
SEVERITY AND DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES 
Ground motions were recorded at 131 sites and in 
46 buildings during the earthquake. Correlation 
of this information with observed damage will 
provide a focus for research for many years to 
come. However, several important observations 
regarding the distribution and severity of struc-
tural damage can already be made. 
First, ground motions recorded in the epicentral 
region were quite severe, ranging up to 64% of 
gravity. Motions greater that 30 to 40 percent 
of gravity were detected over a very wide area. 
Since these levels of motion approach those 
considered in the design of new structures, one 
might expect to see in these areas some signifi-
cant damage to engineered structures, especially 
to older ones designed to lower force levels. 
However, damage in these areas with few excep-
tions concentrated in older unreinforced masonry 
and wooden structures. Other, relatively modern 
types of engineered structures with known seismic 
vulnerabilities (such as non-ductile reinforced 
concrete buildings, tilt-up structures, precast 
buildings, etc.) generally survived the motions 
in the epicentral region without serious damage. 
While the precise reasons for this apparent 
anomaly are under study by many at the moment, it 
reconfirms the limitations of peak ground accel-
eration as a reliable index of earthquake damage 
potential. In this case, the recorded motions in 
the epicentral distance ranged from 6 to 15 
seconds, depending on the record and the method 
used to determine duration. This duration is 
short for this magnitude event. In addition, 
surface displacements induced by the shaking were 
also relatively small in comparison with those 
developed during other damaging earthquakes of 
this magnitude. 
Comparison of the motion and damage data obtained 
for this and other earthquakes will provide very 
important insight into the factors that influence 
damage in structures. Until the outcomes of such 
studies are known, it is prudent to acknowledge 
that the Lorna Prieta earthquake did not generate 
particularly damaging motions in the epicentral 
region and that it may not be conservative to 
extrapolate damages occurring in this region to 
other areas of the Bay Area or the country where 
earthquakes with greater damage potential might 
occur. 
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Damage was quite serious to a wide variety of 
structural types in some areas outside the epi-
central region. In particular, regions of Sar 
Francisco, Oakland and other areas as far as 8C 
to 100 km. from the epicenter suffered signifi-
cant damages. Peak ground accelerations recordec 
on firm soil at these distances were generally 
around 10% of gravity or less. However, most of 
the structures damaged in these areas were 
concentrated around the San Francisco Bay on man 
made ~and overlying bay mud or on soft, deep soil 
deposJ.ts. In these areas motions were recorded 
with peak accelerations ranging between 20 and 
30% of gravity. 
Attenuation of peak ground acceleration at 
distance was substantially less severe than might 
be expected on the basis previous west coast 
eart~quakes. Whether this discrepancy relates to 
specJ.al features of the fault mechanism and 
resulting directivity for the Lorna Prieta earth-
quake or unusual, high amplification of the soft 
bay mud requ.ires add.i tional study. Regardless, 
the large J.nventorJ.es of older, seismically 
vulnerable, structures located over these soils 
resulted in substantial numbers of damaged struc-
tures. Soil effects clearly had a dominant 
influence on the unusual severity and distribu-
tion of damages throughout the Bay Area. 
Nonetheless, serious damage still concentrat<'d 
in only the most vulnerable of structures sine<' 
motions still were generally significantly below 
current design levels. On the other hand, the 
damage observed possibly provides a reasonable 
indication of the damages that might develop over 
a wider area if a large local earthquake occurred 
in the Bay Area. In this case, peak accelera-
tions would approach those that developed only on 
soft soil during the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
These damages also may provide a useful indica-
tion of the nature of damages that might occur 
other areas of the country where similar soft 
soil conditions exist. The 1989 Lorna Prieta and 
1985 Mexico earthquakes clearly point out the 
potential vulnerability of urban areas overlying 
soft deep soil deposit, even for distant earth-
quakes. This should have major implications for 
the P~cific Northwest, the central u.s. and many 
locatJ.ons on the eastern seaboard where similar 
conditions exist. 
Significant damages also occurred to new and 
older buildings in the Palo Alto area. This 
region was relatively close to the epicenter and 
had large stocks of buildings. Ground motions 
ranging between 30 and 40 percent of gravity were 
recorded. Several new concrete and steel build-
ings suffered damaged as did older reinforced 
concrete, wood and masonry structures. 
Thus, it appears that structural damage is highly 
dependent on the nature of the building invento-
ri7s present in the shaken area, the types of 
soJ.l conditions and the specific characteristics 
of the motions generated by the fault rupture and 
that arrive at the site. While efforts aimed at 
micro-zonation must continue, this sensitivity 
makes it from a practical perspective all the 
more important to design structures in accordance 
with the basic lessons learned from past earth-
quakes. 
These earthquakes have suggested the desirability 
of designing simple structures that are inherent-
ly insensitive to the uncertainties associated 
the input motions and soil conditions. Thus, 
emphasis should be placed on avoiding systems 
with limited redundancy or that tend to concen-
trate damage in a few locations, on providing 
details capable of large inelastic deformations 
on selecting structural systems that are able t~ 
limit ?eformations to reasonable levels, and on 
attach1ng nonstructural components in such a 
manner that they do not adversely influence 
structural response and are not extensively 
damaged by the structural deformations. 
The damages produced by the Lorna Prieta earth-
quake must be reviewed to determine the continued 
soundness of these past lessons. In the follow-
ing sections, the performance of a variety of 
structures will be reviewed with this in mind. 
DAMAGE TO WOODEN BUILDINGS 
As indicated previously nearly 20,000 dwelling 
units were damaged during the Lorna Prieta earth-
quake and 10,000 individuals were forced to 
relocate as a result. A majority of these dis-
placed people lived in wood frame houses and 
apartments. Many homes located in the santa cruz 
mountains, in the immediate epicentral reg ion, 
were damaged. Damages ranged from fallen chim·· 
neys and porches to partial or complete collapse. 
Many wood frame buildings in the hardest hit. 
areas were overwhelmed by the seismically induced 
inertia forces. Sadly, the majority of the 
damage occurred in older wood frame buildings 
where the structures were simply not connected to 
their foundations. During the earthquake as 
they have in innumerable past earthquakes,' the 
structures simply shifted off their foundatior, 
with resultant vertical dislocation (Fig. 2). 
Another common type of failure that was observecl 
related wood frame dwellings built upon short. 
pony or cripple walls. These short walls provid-
ed a two to four foot tall access space that wa!· 
used for storage, ventilation and to accommodat• 
sloped sites. In many older buildings the fram-
ing between the ground floor and the foundatioi 
consisted of vertical studs and horizontal sid-
ing. Even though diagonal braces were providec 
in the upper levels to resist lateral loads, th• 
braces were typically omitted from the· pon' 
walls. In addition, the horizontal siding cover: 
ing these walls in most cases had badly deterio-
rated and effectively provided little or no 
lateral resistance (Fig. 3) . The failure of 
these short support walls resulted in large 
vertical and lateral displacements of the sup-
ported structures (Fig. 4). 
The unfortunate aspect of both of these forms of 
damage is that simple and economical retrofit 
procedures, if implemented prior to the earth-
quake, could have prevented or significantly 
reduced the severity of the observed damages. 
Repair following the earthquake was generally 
extremely expensive as a result of not only the 
required structural repairs, but because of wide 
spread damages to architectural, electrical and 
mechanical features. Pre-earthquake retrofits to 
these walls and foundations were seen to be 
effective in several instances in Santa Cruz and 
elsewhere. 
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Another form of damage to wooden structures was 
observed in the Marina District in san Francisco. 
This area was constructed on loose, fine sandy 
hydraulic fill. During the earthquake the area 
exhibited evidence of significant liquefaction 
with localized sand boils, lateral spreading, 
slumping and heaving of sidewalks and roadways. 
Many wood buildings were damaged or collapsed in 
this area. However, a detailed inspection of the 
damages indicates that the collapses concentrate 
in three or four story apartment buildings 
(Fig. 5) located on the corners of blocks (or 
where a structure was not sandwiched between two 
oth~r adjacent buildings with little or no sepa-
rat1on). These older apartment buildings were 
generally constructed with relatively massive 
apartment floors supported over a level of garag-
es (Fig. 6). The bottom level thus was largely 
open to allow for multiple garage door openings. 
Typically, parking stalls were several cars deep 
and often extended out though the back of the 
building to provide for even more parking. This 
situation resulted in a soft first story. Later-
al load resistance was provided by horizontal 
wood sheathing (covered by brick veneer) placed 
over only a few walls. This sheathing was ob-
served to have decayed severely in many cases 
during the life of the structure. 
The amplified seismic motions in the Marina 
District resulted in the collapse of the lower 
level of these corner apartment buildings in many 
cases. It is significant to note that these 
types of apartment complexes are quit common 
throughout San Francisco. Some apparently iden-
tical buildings located only a few blocks away 
from the heavily damaged area, but on firmer 
ground, remained virtually undamaged following 
the earthquake. Nonetheless, the potential 
hazard posed by these structures during future 
more severe earthquakes should be carefully 
investigated. 
Initial suppositions regarding to the causes of 
the severe structural damage in the Marina Dis-
trict focused on the observed soil liquefaction. 
However, structures did not collapse or suffer 
subs~antial damage even in the most heavily 
affl1cted area, if the lateral load resisting 
system was continuous over the height of the 
building. Another remarkable feature was the 
limited damage to residential homes located along 
the middle of a block. These structures typical-
ly were two or three stories tall, with adjacent 
structures having the same floor elevations and 
virtually no separation. As noted in during 
other recent earthquakes, such structures seem 
(at least initially) to buttress one another and 
suffer only limited damage. 
More extensive damage occurred in buildings 
located at the corners of blocks. Where lique-
faction occurred near or under a structure 
vertical differential settlements of a few inche; 
were observed with resultant structural and 
especially architectural damage. Similar damages 
~ere also observed in other areas of San Francis-
co, notably in the Mission Creek area located 
south of Market street. 
DAMAGE TO UNREINFORCED MASONRY BUILDINGS 
The older downtown areas of many well established 
cities in California were built of unreinforced 
masonry. These commercial areas suffered signif-
icant damages in Watsonville, Santa Cruz, Oakland 
and San Francisco. However, damage appears to be 
strongly influenced by local soil conditions and 
the intensity of ground motions. This can be 
seen in the following table where the approximate 
numbers of unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings 
vacated following the earthquake are compared 
with the total stocks in various cities. Cities 
are listed in order of decreasing epicentral 
distance. 
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Only limited damage was detected in Gilroy, for 
instance, even though motions in excess of 50 
percent of gravity were recorded in the vicinity 
of several unreinforced masonry structures. I 
other cities damage only concentrated in certain 
areas, with severe damage in some areas and 
virtually none in others. While soil conditions 
play an important role in this, the precise 
interrelationships between the various factors 
influencing damage in this class of hazardous 
structure needs careful study. 
The most prevalent form of damage to these struc-
tures was the collapse or dislocation of para-
pets. In most of these cases the masonry was 
tied to the floor diaphragm by means of steel 
anchors. The short extension of the wall above 
the roof fell from many buildings, even where 
only moderate ground motions occurred far from 
the epicentral region. 
A particularly devastating form of damage result-
ed when the walls were not tied to the floor 
diaphragms. In many cases the walls failed out-
of-plane, falling into the street (Fig. 7). In 
several notable cases the walls fell from upper 
floors of a building onto the roof of a lower 
adjacent structure (Fig. 8). The damage to the 
lower building resulted in two deaths in two 
separate buildings in Santa Cruz. In another 
instance, five casualties resulted as a wall 
collapsed in to the sidewalk area in front of an 
unreinforced masonry structure. For the level of 
shaking encountered, moderate amounts of tie 
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reinforcement appeared effective in limiting thi 
type of damage. 
In some cases in-plane shear failures of bricl 
~alls was observed (Fig. 9). In some cases thi~ 
distress resulted in local collapse of wal 
;1anels. In other buildings wide spread, incliner 
':racks developed, stepping along weak morta 
·; Jints. In many cases buildings with moderat• 
c~acking have been left un-repaired with contin-
ued occupancy or the cracks have been simply 
repaired with epoxy injection to insure water 
tightness. 
Brick and stone architectural veneers fell frorr 
many buildings. Typical metal inserts embeddec 
in the mortar joints proved insufficient when thE 
attachment nails pulled from the wood framing. 
The framing under the veneer had deterioratec 
badly in many of these cases. In other cases th~ 
veneers were dislodged as a result of hammerins 
against adjacent structures. 
DAMAGE TO REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES 
tvhile non-ductile concrete frames have performc·' 
~-oor1y in past earthquakes, few of these types of 
··.lildings (see later comments on concrete bridg-
;'s) were located in areas subject to severe 
ground shakings during the Loma Prieta earth-
quake. In some cases severe shear cracks were 
observed in columns. However, the buildings in 
question (for example, along Mission Street near 
Third Street in San Francisco) were located mid-
block with no space separating them from the 
adjacent structures. It is expected that the 
adjacent structures provided the required later 
resistance in these cases. 
In Watsonville, where peak accelerations of 39 
g were recorded, an old five story reinforc-·.l 
concrete frame structure appeared to suff,~r 
mainly architectural damage. The building had a 
number of broad shear walls which apparently 
accounted for its good behavior in spite of the 
sever motions recorded in the area. 
Damage was observed in a number of newer rein-
forced concrete structures. For example, a me-
chanical penthouse, containing a water tank, fell 
from the top of a reinforced concrete multistory 
hotel in Burlingame. Across the street another 
hotel, build less than 16 months prior to the 
earthquake, suffered significant damages to its 
shear walls in the lower levels and to its dia-
phragms near the shear walls. Both of these 
hotels were constructed on fill over bay mud. 
Motions at the nearby San Francisco International 
Airport were up to 33%g. 
A ten story moment frame constructed in San Jose 
of lightweight concrete suffered severe spalling 
damages in several locations and architectural 
damages in spite of ground motions in the area 
less than 11 % g. Lightweight concrete shear 
walls in a 15 story telecommunications building 
(Fig. 10) in Oakland suffered severe cracking, 
spalling and splitting in the lower story. This 
building was designed as a dual system with steel 
frames proportioned to carry 25% of the lateral 
forces along with the gravity loads. 
F.g. 2 Damage to House Not Bolted to Foundation 
Fig. 1 Area Map 
Fig . 3 Damage to "Pony " Wall 
-
Fig. 4 Collapse of Home on "Pony" Walls f g. 5 Collapse of Apa rtment in Marina Distric t 
Fig. 6 Typcial Marina District Apartment Fig. 7 Out-of-Plane Failure of Masonry Wall 
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Damage also occurred in reinforced concrete 
buildings used as hospitals and schools. The 
seven story tower of the Peralta Hospital, built 
in Oakland in 1927, was severely damaged and has 
been demolished following the earthquake. The 
Palo Alto Veterans Administration Hospital suf-
fered serious damage, including shear cracking to 
the columns in two of six buildings. The four 
buildings without damage had been previously 
retrofit. A number of reinforced concrete build-
ings on the Stanford University campus, including 
the School of Business Administration, the Li-
brary and some residence halls suffered moderate 
cracking. The John O'Connell High School in San 
Francisco suffered serious structural cracking to 
its frame-wall system. 
DAMAGE TO STEEL BUILDINGS 
Damage to steel buildings was typically less 
obvious than that to masonry or concrete struc-
tures. However, there were several reports of 
buckled braces in several buildings along the San 
Francisco Peninsula near San Mateo and Palo Alto. 
In most cases these could be fixed within a few 
days. In other cases substantial effort was 
needed to find damage in buildings where large 
amounts of architectural distress suggested the 
presence of structural damage. Evidence of panel 
zone buckling, gusset plate yielding and buck-
ling, and column buckling were found in several 
buildings. 
DAMAGE TO RETROFIT STRUCTURES 
The engineering profession has known for many 
years of the seismic vulnerability of many types 
of structural systems and has attempted to retro-
fit many of these structures. The Lorna Prieta 
earthquake provides an opportunity to assess the 
efficacy of the procedures used. 
A good example of the effectiveness of retrofits 
is the performance of a four story reinforced 
concrete telecommunications building in Watsonvi-
lle. This building had been be upgraded by 
infilling windows and adding shear walls. During 
the earthquake accelerations were recorded up to 
1.24g at the roof without the building suffering 
any significant structural damage. Another exam-
ple is the retrofit reinforced concrete struc-
tures at the Veterans Administration Hospital in 
Palo Alto. As mentioned previously, these 
suffered little damage in comparison to the 
non-retrofit units. 
on the other hand, there is ample evidence that 
some retrofit schemes did not work as well. This 
is attributable to the lack of any performance 
standards for retrofit work, any code to set load 
and detailing requirements, and virtually no 
research on the effectiveness of many type of 
retrofit procedures used in practice. 
One example of this situation is a 6 story rein-
forced concrete building constructed in San 
Francisco at the order of corner and Fourth 
Street during the early 1980's (Fig. 11). During 
change of ownership a few years after it was 
built a number of seismic deficiencies were 
identified. These were remedied on the basis of 
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protection of the life safety of the occupants b: 
adding steel braces and shear walls. Followin~ 
the earthquake, the connections in the stee_ 
braces were observed to buckle (Fig. 12), th" 
attachments f the braces to the concrete frame~ 
had slipped (in some cases due to faulty instal-
lation of anchor bolts), extensive crackin~ 
occurred in the shear walls, and initiation of 
punching shear failures in a few column to flat 
late connections. The building has been sincE 
repaired (Fig. 13) to restore the capacity that 
existed at the time of the earthquake. 
Another example, is the Hotel Oakland in Oak-
land. This is a steel frame building with exten-
sive masonry infill panels. In retrofitting thi~ 
structure new lateral load resisting elements. 
were added and the exterior masonry elements were 
positively attached to the building to prevent 
large panels from falling into the street. As 
result of the earthquake nearly all of the mason-
ry piers in the building developed distinctive 
x-shaped shear cracks. In addition, at a few 
locations masonry elements were dislodged from 
the building and fell to the street (Fig. 14). 
This building apparently preserved life safety as 
intended, but extensive and expensive repairs 
were required to restore the building fully to 
service. 
Most of the focus of retrofit work has logically 
been on unreinforced masonry buildings. In a 
recent study by Conrad (1990) 400 of San Francis-
co's more than 2000 URM buildings were inspected 
and 69 were identified that had been retrofit to 
some degree. This would indicate that only about 
3% of the city's URM buildings have been retro-
fit. Most of the retrofits had been implemented 
through the introduction of steel braces. Retro-
fit structures tended to be found in clusters 
where a local community was being redeveloped. 
The report found that 54% of the retrofit build-
ings suffered no damage, but no comparison with 
he performance with adjacent non-retrofit struc-
tures was offered. Light damage was observed in 
22% of the retrofit structures and moderate 
damage was seen in 20%. Heavy damage was seen in 
three buildings (3%). 
One of these structures (259 Front Street) was 
located at the corner of a block and it was 
heavily braced along two street sides (Fig. 15). 
The added braces at the street level buckled out 
of plane significantly (Fig. 16), but no damage 
was actually found in the masonry portions of 
this four story building. The second structure 
(1051-1075 Battery Street) was also braced but 
the mortar in the existing masonry walls was 
apparently so poor that random sections of the 
exterior wall fell from the building. Another 
building (located at sixth Street and Bluxome 
streets) had apparently been partially retrofit 
by addition of wall anchors. Five people were 
killed as the upper level wall on one side of the 
structure fell onto the sidewalk and street. In 
all of these cases it is clear that the lack of 
a consistent, systems approach to the design of 
the retrofits had a detrimental effect and that 
a new class of potentially hazardous buildings 
(i.e., the inadequately retrofit structure) needs 
to be investigated. 
fig . 8 Masonry Wal l Fell on to Ad jacent Roof 
Fig. 10 Lightweight Concrete Shear Walls 
Failed at Base of Building 
Fig . 12 Buckled Brace Intersection 
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Fig . 9 In-Plane Failure of Masonry Wall 
Fig. 11 Retrofit of New Reinforced Concre~ ~ 
Building 
Fig. 13 Repair of Damaged Intersection 
DAMAGE DUE TO HAMMERING OF ADJACENT BUILDINGS 
Another important observation from the Lorna 
Prieta earthquake is that many buildings suffered 
damage due to pounding. The separation of many 
buildings was insufficient to avoid collision of 
the upper stories. As a result a wide range of 
damage resulted, from local spalling of veneers 
near the impact point through cracking of verti-
cal supporting members to failure (though not 
collapse) of columns. Field inspections have 
identified several hundred cases where pounding 
contributed to the observed damage. In many 
instances it was apparent that a few more cycles 
of impact could have caused the failure of one of 
the structures involved (Fig. 17). In many of 
the severely damage unreinforced masonry struc-
tures evidence suggests that pounding was a 
contributor to the damage. 
In one instrumented building in Oakland (at the 
intersection of 17th and Harrison Streets) the 
records show clear evidence of pounding at one 
corner of the building. The steel moment frame 
building (with reinforced masonry walls along 
the property lines) was separated from the adja-
cent unreinforced masonry storefront by about an 
inch. However, no significant damage was ob-
served in either building as a result of the 
pounding. 
Damage due during the 1985 Mexico and other 
earthquakes suggest that pounding is a serious 
problem that needs to be addressed by the engi-
neering profession. A number of investigators 
are currently studying this problem as it relates 
to the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
DAMAGE TO BRIDGE STRUCTURES 
More than 1500 bridges exist in the area affected 
by the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Eighty of these 
suffered some relatively minor damage during the 
earthquake, ten required shoring (though traffic 
continued to flow over them during the repairs) 
and another ten were closed due to the severity 
of the damage. Three bridges suffered collapse 
of one or more spans. These were the double deck 
Cypress Street Viaduct, the truss section of the 
San Francisco - Oakland Bay Bridge and the Struve 
Slough bridge west of Watsonville. The collapsed 
span on the Bay Bridge was replaced within about 
a month. The Cypress Street Viaduct has been 
demolished, and six other double deck viaducts in 
and near San Francisco remain closed a year after 
the earthquake awaiting the results of engineer-
ing studies to determine whether they can be 
economically retrofit. The Struve Slough bridge 
was removed and rebuilt within a few months using 
modern design practices. 
Virtually all of the bridges in the area had 
undergone the Phase I retrofit program, initiated 
by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) following the 1971 san Fernando earth-
quake. These retrofits consisted of installing 
cable restrainers at bridge expansion joints 
which are intended to prevent bridge deck members 
from sliding from their seats. These retrofits 
proved to be generally quite effective during the 
earthquake. In addition, at the time of the 
earthquake several bridges in the Bay Area, 
including the double deck Interstate 480 Embarca-
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dero viaduct, were under design review for Phas 
II retrofits. The focus of this new retrofi 
effort was on tall single columns bents tha 
failed catastrophically during the 1971 Sa 
Fernando event. 
DAMAGE TO STEEL BRIDGES 
A number of long span steel bridges are used ir 
the Bay Area to cross the bay and to span ove 
the Sacramento River. Damage was reported tr 
three of these: the San Francisco - Oakland Ba: 
Bridge on Interstate 80, the San Mateo - Haywarc 
Bridge on Highway 92 and the Carquinez BridgE 
where Interstate 80 crosses the Sacramento River 
at Carquinez Straits. 
The portion of the San Francisco - Oakland Ba::r 
Bridge east of Yerba Buena Island consists of c 
double level freeway supported on truss spans. 
A large steel tower (numbered E9) is providec. 
near the center of this segment of the bridge. 
This tower resists longitudinal loads from a 
single 506-ft. span to the west and two 290-ft. 
spans to the east. The two concrete roadways 
extend across the tower on sets of 50-ft. long, 
simply supported steel beams running parallel to 
the bridge's longitudinal axis. Each of these 
beams was bolted to a seat angle on the east, but 
the seat was allowed to slide freely at the west 
end. During the earthquake the beams slid from 
the free end with the west end of the upper deck 
resting on the lower one (Figs. 18 and 19). The 
lower deck was also unseated and came to rest 
several feet lower on an electrical transformer 
housing and the tower braces. 
In addition, the bottom chords of the trusses 
were attached to the tower by means of twenty 
l-in. diameter bolts. During the earthquake the 
bolts in the connection on the east side of the 
tower sheared completely and the bearing plate 
moved approximately 5-10 inches to the east. 
This was probably the proximate cause of the 
roadway beams slipping from their seats. 
Additional damage to the eastern portions of the 
bridge were also identified. These damages 
ranged from spalling of concrete in support piers 
to shifting of bearing plates and breakage of 
anchor bolts. 
The bridge was repaired by jacking the eastern 
segments back into place and providing new road-
way beams and supports. The support seats were 
constructed about 50% longer than in he original 
design. A more extensive study is currently 
under way by Prof. A. Astaneh and his colleagues 
at the University of California, Berkeley and by 
Caltrans to assess more reliable long term retro-
fits. 
The San Mateo - Hayward Bridge is a steel ortho-
topic box girder bridge with a main span of 
750-ft. During the earthquake one of the bearing 
assembles on an approach pier shifted. The cap 
screw used to retain the 5-1/2-inch diameter 
bearing pin stripped off. The upper portion of 
the bearing assembly shifted with respect to the 
lower potion by about 2-3/4 inches. The bridge 
was jacked back into position and repaired with-
out interruption of traffic. 
Fig. 14 Damage to Retrofit Steel Frame Building 
with Masonry Infilled Wal ls 
Fi g. 16 Buc k led Brace in URM Building 
Steel IOWOf 81 P18t E9 -
f----- 5(7--- ----.J 
Fig. 15 Retrofit URM Building with Steel Braces 
Fig. 1 7 Poundi ng Damage 
~ q . Jli D<>ta . • at o 1 lapsed s ec- t 1or. o f Bay B d~· · Fig. 19 Detail of Seat Connection on Bay Bridge 
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The Carquinez Bridge consists of a pair of steel 
cantilever truss spans. Bearings supporting 
steel plate girder on the approach to the bridge 
reportedly tipped over. These were repaired by 
jacking the girders up and re-setting the gird-
ers. In addition, the piers supporting the truss 
spans shifted in some locations as much at 2-in-
ches. 
The closure of the San Francisco - Oakland Bay 
Bridge and the damage to the other bridges cross-
ing the bay clearly indicated how vital these 
arteries were to transport within the Bay Area. 
The Governor of the State of California has since 
signed a proclamation mandating that such criti-
cal bridge structures be designed to remain 
operable following a major earthquake. This is 
a significant departure from the emphasis placed 
on life safety in the design of such structures. 
DAMAGE TO REINFORCED CONCRETE BRIDGES 
The most spectacular damage to reinforced con-
crete bridges was the catastrophic collapse of 
nearly a mile long portion of the upper deck of 
the Cypress Street Viaduct located in west 
Oakland on poor soil reclaimed from the bay (Fig. 
20). This structure was designed in the early 
1950's and construction was completed in 1957. 
The death toll for his collapse was 42, though as 
mentioned earlier a thousand fatalities or so 
casualties might have been expected had the 
earthquake occurred during congested rush hour 
traffic. A variety of factors contributed to the 
failure of the structure. These include the 
amplification of the ground motions in the vicin-
ity due to the soft soil conditions, traveling 
wave effects, and variable soil conditions. The 
structure also was designed at a time when earth-
quake resistant design procedures were not highly 
developed. Thus, while the bridge appears to 
have been conservatively designed relative to the 
structural requirements in force at the time of 
its construction, it has a number of major defi-
ciencies with respect to current construction 
practices. 
This bridge represented in many respects a sub-
stantial advance in the state of the art at the 
time it was built. Not only did it have two 
levels, it was one of the first major bridge 
structures in the U.S. to employ post-tensioning 
and large diameter reinforcing bars. In mqst 
cases the structural system incorporated a sig-
nificant number of flexural hinges in order 
simplify the future addition of access ramps, to 
reduce secondary forces resulting from deforma-
tions associated with post- tensioning and foun-
dation settlement, to reduce computational effort 
and to control moments that could be transferred 
to the foundations. This resulted in a structure 
that was nearly statically determinant. In addi-
tion, detailing did not incorporate features 
needed to impart ductility to the elements (shear 
reinforcement sufficient to develop the flexural 
capacity of members, confinement of potential 
plastic hinge regions and inadequate development 
length on reinforcement), and joints were nei-
ther confined nor designed to resist the shear 
forces associated with realistic lateral load-
ings. Details of a typical transverse bent are 
shown in Fig. 21. In addition, in the longitudi-
nal direction, frame action depended on the 
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bending forces developed in the decks beinr 
transferred to the columns by torsional force. 
developed by shear friction. A relatively mas-
sive and brittle structure resulted. 
Detailed studies by Nims et al (1989) and other. 
have indicated that any of a number of structura_ 
deficiencies could have triggered the collapse 
The lack of redundancy (needed to redistribut< 
forces in the event of the failure of an element, 
and the brittle details utilized made the fina_ 
catastrophic outcome a certainty, regardless o. 
the actual trigger of the failure and inpu 
details. 
The dominant features of the typical collaps• 
mechanism are shown in Fig. 22. Shear cracks ir 
the pedestal supporting the hinged upper level 
columns were able to extend downward into the 
joint region following the projection of downwarc 
bending hooks on the end of the transverse gird-
er's (cap's) top level reinforcement. The lac~ 
shear reinforcement in the joint allowed thh 
inclined crack to act like a slide, with the 
resultant pancake collapse of the upper level. 
The sudden and catastrophic nature of this fail-
ure mechanism was demonstrated convincingly 
during the demolition of the Viaduct. A wreckin~ 
ball was used to initiate failure in a singlE 
column. Almost immediately progressive collapsE 
occurred throughout the upper level not only 
extending transversely across the roadway, bur 
also longitudinally for six bays to the end c f 
the remaining standing portion of the viaduct. 
Clearly, such brittle structures are not compati-
ble with seismic resistant design. 
Upon construction of the Cypress Street Viaduc~ 
a series of six other double deck viaducts were 
designed and constructed in the Bay Area. All of 
these suffered damages during the earthquake. 
Each suffered characteristic distress in the 
lower joint regions similar to that developed ir 
the cypress Street structure. An example of thi~ 
is the Southern Freeway portion of Interstate 28( 
located near the southern border of San Franciscc 
(Fig. 24). 
A bent in a curved connector structure betweer 
Interstates 880 and 980 near the Cypress Viaduct 
also suffered damage. A knee joint extending 
transversely from the side of the deck developed 
severe shear cracks and a #18 bar fractured at 
the hook (Fig. 25). The apparently inadequa~ 
shear capacity of such joints is of concern sine~ 
the structure was only about two years old at the 
time of the earthquake. Similar damages were 
seen on several older single level viaducts 
(e.g., where Interstate 280 crosses Mission 
Creek). Improved design criteria and retrofit 
procedures for such knee joints are under inves-
tigation by Caltrans. 
Two short bridges crossed over Struve Slough 
near Watsonville. These consisted of multiple, 
skewed T-beam spans supported on monolithic pile 
bents. During the earthquake the supporting 
piles failed in shear, resulting in the deck on 
one of the bridges collapsing and the piles 
punching up through the deck. 
RETROFIT TESTS OF CYPRESS VIADUCT 
The need for rapid retrofit of the damaged double 
deck freeways in San Francisco led to a series of 
field te~ts on undamaged portions of the Cypress 
Street V1aduct. These tests consisted of forced 
vibra~io~ studies to determine the dynamic char-
acter1st1cs of the structure and static lateral 
load tests in the transverse direction to deter-
mine force and deformation capacities. Tests 
were performed on a relatively unmodified segment 
of the.structure, a~ well as on the same segment 
after 1t was retrof1t. The three bents used in 
the tests are shown in Fig. 26. The results of 
the~e tests have been reported by Moehle and 
Mah1n (1990). 
Tests on the original structure indicate that the 
';IPJ?er column pedestal and the adjacent lower 
J01nt developed cracking characteristic of the 
damage leading to the failure of the structure 
(Fig. 22) at a displacement of about 3/4-in. at 
the upper deck level. The total lateral load of 
1400 kips.applied to the three bents corresponds 
to an equ1valent base shear coefficient of about 
0.32 assuming a 2:1 distribution of loads to the 
upper and lower deck levels. A simple elastic 
time history analysis of the test structure has 
shown that it would have required a base shear 
coefficient of at least 61% to have remained 
elas~ic for a ground motion recorded nearby. The 
work1ng stress base shear coefficient required in 
the original design was 0.06. 
Three different types of retrofits for the lower 
joints were investigated. In addition upper and 
lowe: bent caps (girders) were exter~ally post-
tens1oned to help compensate for inadequate bar 
development lengths, and to provide increased 
strength and confinement in the joints. Most of 
the columns were reinforced in shear by adding 
exterior post-tensioning. 
The retrofits were able to maintain the vertical 
load integrity of the test structure. However, 
significant damage was observed. In particular 
the critical failure zone moved away from th~ 
lo~er join~ ~o the upper joints, which began to 
fa11 and d1s1ntegrate during the tests. Shear 
cracks in the upper joints began at displacements 
at the upper deck level less than l-in. In addi-
tion,the non-retrofit columns began to fail in 
shear at an upper deck level displacement of 
about 1.5-in. and an equivalent base shear coef-
ficient of about 0.61. 
After strengthening the shear damaged columns, 
the structure was again cycled and lateral dis-
placements of 9.8-in. were achieved at its top 
along with equivalent base shear coefficients of 
o. 91. These values are about 13 and 3 times 
greater, respectively, than the values that could 
have been developed by the original structure. 
One of the bents had heavy steel wide flange 
sections post-tensioned vertically along the face 
of the columns like splints. During the tests 
composite action could not be maintained and the 
relatively long lengths of unbounded post-ten-
sioning steel used resulted in large cracks and 
spalling in the lower joints and in gaps between 
the steel and the concrete (loss of confinement) 
over large portion of the columns and joints. 
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Another bent had inclined rock anchors grouted in 
the lower joints. This bonded reinforcement 
pr~ved effective in resisting perpendicularly 
or1ented shear cracks. However, towards the end 
~f.the tests spal~ing and flexural cracking and 
J01nt shear crack1ng had begun. The continued 
integrity of this retrofit scheme under these 
conditions was not fully addressed. 
The third retrofit consisted of a heavy steel 
collar placed around the pedestal and the base of 
the ~pper level colu~n. This collar was post-
ten~1oned to the s1des of the lower joint. 
Dur1ng the test the collar was observed to rotate 
about the 1 ower joint and , upon its remov a 1 
~oll~wing the tests, fully developed sets of 
1ncl1ned cracks were observed in the joint along 
with much pulverized concrete. 
These tests indicate the effectiveness of retro-
fitting existing bridge structures. However, 
they point out the need to consider a structure 
as a system and not to simply fix the damaged or 
overstressed portions. The limitations of the 
tests must also be recognized. Loading of the 
test structure was halted when the test site had 
to be vacated. However, it was not believed safe 
to continue testing at that time. The deforma-
tion history imposed may not be conservative for 
the most severe ground motions expected in the 
Bay Area. In addition, no attempt was rnade to 
retrofit or test the structure in the longitudi-
nal direction and this mode of behavior must be 
carefully considered. 
LOSS OF FUNCTIONALITY 
An important observation regarding the damage to 
structures has been the public 1 s reaction to 
them. Most structures performed generally in 
c~nformance with the design professions expecta-
t1ons. New structures and most engineered struc-
tures did not collapse, and life safety was 
protected, in regions of severe shaking. Howev-
er, these motions were not the most severe or 
damaging that might be expected in the Bay Area. 
Moreover, the public reaction to these damages 
was generally that they were excessive. 
There was much nonstructural damage to parti-
tions, ceilings, cladding and contents (Fig. 28) 
in structures with little or no structural dam-
age. T?is damage not only contributed a signifi-
cant l1fe safety threat in many cases, it dis-
rupted the functionality of the structures and 
added substantially to repair costs. One ten 
story building in Oakland reportedly had $6 
million in water damages due to the breakage of 
a fire sprinkler line. 
Structural damages were repaired quickly in many 
cases, but in other cases considerable delays 
were encountered as owners await financing or as 
technical difficulties are encountered. In many 
cases the resulting repairs were cosmetic or 
intended to simply restore the structure to its 
pre-quake condition. 
Large institutional owners or ones with signifi-
cant capital investments have increasingly devel-
oped heightened awareness of the need to control 
damage. In addition to consideration of life 
safety for a structure 1 s occupants, they have 
Fig. 20 Collapse of Cypress Street Viaduct 
Crlticb) 
Creek 
Fig. 22 Postulated Failure Mode 
Fig . 24 Damage to Southern Freeway 
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F1g . 23 Failure Mode Observed during Demolition 
Fig. 25 Damaged Knee Joint in New Freeway 
become concerned over institutional life safety. 
For example, Stanford University has developed 
much more stringent criteria since the earthquake 
for retrofitting their seismically hazardous 
buildings. Having had to relocate several .d7-
partments and instructional and research ~ac1l1-
ties following the earthquake, they now st1pulate 
that buildings should be designed or retrofit to 
permit repairs to be made withi.n a few days or 
weeks of the earthquake (depend1ng on the occu-
pancy of the building). Other institutions that 
cannot similarly just pick up and move have come 
to similar conclusions. Similarly, the .Gove:-
nor•s proclamation also indica~es that Cal1f?rn1a 
state buildings should be bu1lt or r~trof1t.so 
that they would remain operable follow1ng a ma~or 
earthquake. This is a major departure relat1ve 
to the design of buildings. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESISTANT DESIGN 
Few new lessons have been developed as a result 
of the Loma Prieta earthquake. However, as the 
first major urban earthquake in the U.S. in 
nearly two decades, the earthquake stands as a 
compelling reminder of many important p~s~ les-
sons. we have again seen the vulnerab~l1ty ~f 
several major classes of buildings des1gned 1n 
earlier eras when our knowledge of earthquake 
resistance was not fully developed. The.da~ages 
to the numerous unreinforced concrete bu1ld1ngs, 
wood dwellings with inadequate foundation.atta~h­
ments, soft story structures (e.g., .Mar1na D1s-
trict apartment houses) and non-duct1le co:r;crete 
fr·ames (e.g., double deck viaducts) are rem1nders 
of well-known past lessons. 
similarly, the important effects of soil liqu7-
faction and site amplification have been see:r; 1n 
many past earthquakes, such as the 1985 Mex1co, 
1967 Venezuela and 1964 Nigatta, Japan earth-
quakes. The Lorna Prieta earthquake indicates t~at 
these soft soil sites should be carefully cons1d-
ered in design as they will be sensitive not only 
to close earthquakes, but also to any number of 
earthquakes gEnerated on other relatively distant 
faults. 
The special need to have a safe ~nd dependable 
transportation system has been aga1n demonstrat-
ed. It has been seen that certain structures may 
be more critical than others, and greater levels 
of conservatism should be considered in their 
design. 
At the same time some past phenomena were not 
seen. However, the Lama Prieta earthquake appears 
to be an unusual earthquake in many respects and 
its motion in the epicentral region appears not 
to be as damaging as other typical west co~st 
earthquakes have been. Thus, th~ good.behav1or 
of some types of structures dur1ng th1~ eart~­
quake should not lead to complacency 1n the1r 
retrofit given the seismicity of the Bay Area. 
The damages provide a clear warning to the Bay 
Area and to other seismically active areas to 
increase preparedness activities. In partic~la7, 
the substantial hazard posed by our older se1~m1-
cally vulnerable structures mu~t be remed17d • 
This can only be done through rel1able e~aluat1on 
and retrofit criteria developed and val1d~ted.on 
the basis of laboratory research and quant1tat1ve 
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investigations of the seismic performance of 
buildings during earthquakes. 
The earthquake has shown a greater value being 
placed by the public, government and corporate 
entities on reducing economic as well as life 
hazards. Control of damage during earthquakes 
need not involve great expense, but additional 
attention to the selection of the structural 
system and to detailing of nonstructural com~o­
nents. Additional research is needed to prov1de 
a reliable design basis for such considerations. 
Finally, it must be recalled that the timing and 
location of the Lorna Prieta earthquake were 
fortuitous. The epicenter was in a sparsely 
populated region relatively far from urban cen-
ters. It also occurred at a time when many people 
were away from the most vulnerable structures. 
This set of favorable circumstances can not be 
expected to occur for all future earthquakes. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Many of the research observations made in this 
paper were made possible by the generous research 
support provided by the National Science Founda-
tion and the California Department of Transporta-
tion. In addition, the author would like to thank 
his many colleagues, especially Jack Moehle, 
Hasan Astaneh and Roy Stephen, for sharing their 
observations with him. The findings and conclu-
sions of this paper, however, must be blamed 
solely on the author alone. 
REFERENCES 
Astaneh, H. et al (1989), "Preliminary Report on 
the Seismological and Engineering Aspects of the 
October 17, 1989 Santa Cruz Lorna Prieta) Earth-
quake," Report No. UCB/EERC-89/14, Earthquake 
Engineering Research Center, Univ. of California, 
Berkeley, October. 
Benuska, Lee, Editor (1990), "Lorna Prieta Earth-
quake Reconnaissance Report," Earthquake Spectra, 
EERI, Supplement to Vol. 6, May. 
Conrad, J. (1990), "Performance Evaluation of 
Strengthened Unreinforced Masonry Structures 
Following the October 17, 198 Lama Prieta Earth-
quake," Graduate student Report, Dept. of Civil 
Engineering, Univ. of California, Berkeley, May. 
Dames and Moore (1990), A Special Report on the 
Oct. 17, 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, Los Angel-
es, CA, January. 
EQE Engineering (1989), Oct. 17, 1989 Loma Prieta 
Earthquake: A Quick Look Report, San Francisco, 
CA, November. 
The Governor's Board of Inquiry on the 1989 lorna 
Prieta Earthquake (1990), "Competing Against 
Time, 11 Report to Governor Georqe Deukmej ian, 
Housner, G.W., Board Chairman, Thiel, c.c., 
Editor, May. 
Nims,D.K. et al (1989), "Collapse of the Cypress 
Street Viaduct as a Result of the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake," Report No. UCB/EERC- 89/16, Earth-
quake Engineering Research Center, University o f 
California, Berkeley, November. 
Seed, R.B. et al (1990), "Preliminary report on 
the Geotechnical Aspects of the October 17, 1989 
Loma Prieta Earthquake," Report No . UCB/EERC-
90/05, Earthquake Engineering Research center, 
Univ. of Calif . , Berkeley, April. 
Fig . ?B Da~aqe to Buildina Contents 
. ... 
i g . ;>.., Hye+-pretir Plots f<'r Fe+-r,.,fit Via<in<"'t: 
1600 
